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Abstract 
Focusing on recent malware that allegedly targeted Iran’s nuclear programme, this 
article discusses the legality of inter-state cyber operations as measures to prevent the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons approaching the topic from the perspective of the law 
of State responsibility, in particular the circumstances precluding wrongfulness. After 
examining the role that cyber attacks and cyber exploitation can play in preventing 
nuclear proliferation, the article explores whether cyber operations can be justified as 
countermeasures in response to a possible breach by Iran of its non-proliferation 
obligations. It then discusses whether counterproliferation cyber operations amounting 
                                                          
1 Reader in International Law, School of Law, University of Westminster. I am grateful to Pierre-
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this article. All errors and omissions remain mine. The author gratefully acknowledges the financial 
support received from the Leverhulme Trust in order to conduct the research of which this article is one 
of the outputs. This article is based on developments as of November 2013 and all websites were also last 
visited on that date. 
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to a use of force are submitted to a more lenient legal regime than other forms of the use 
of force in international relations. Finally, the article explores the legality of 
counterproliferation cyber operations from the perspective of Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter, and in particular of the resolutions adopted against Iran by the Security 
Council. The article concludes that the legality of counterproliferation cyber operations 
must be assessed in the light of the general primary and secondary rules of international 
law: neither the means used (cyber instead of kinetic) nor the aim pursued (the non-
proliferation of nuclear weapons) justify a special legal regime. 
 
Keywords 
Cyber operations, nuclear proliferation, Iran, Stuxnet, circumstances precluding 
wrongfulness, countermeasures. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In September 2010, it was reported that a computer worm, named Stuxnet, had attacked 
Iran’s industrial infrastructure with the alleged ultimate purpose of sabotaging the gas 
centrifuges at the Natanz uranium enrichment facility, where the Islamic Republic is 
suspected of conducting a military nuclear programme that may lead to a violation of its 
obligations under Article II of the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons (NPT).2 Even though an earlier version had already been released as early as 
                                                          
2 According to Art II of the NPT, ‘[e]ach non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to 
receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices 
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2007,3 the worm mainly operated in three waves between June 2009 and May 2010. It 
was also reported that, in December 2012, the worm reappeared and targeted companies 
in southern Iran.4 In October 2011, other malware, dubbed DuQu, was discovered: its 
code had striking similarities with Stuxnet although its payload was not designed to 
cause physical damage but to obtain information that could be used to attack industrial 
control systems.5 Malware, dubbed Flame, was also found in May 2012 to have 
penetrated the computers of senior Iranian officials with the alleged purpose of stealing 
sensitive data. Disguised as a routine Microsoft update, Flame collected intelligence 
from a variety of sources and sent it back to its controllers, but, unlike Stuxnet, did not 
cause material damage.6 Although the evidence is at best circumstantial,7 the 
                                                                                                                                                                          
or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or 
otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any 
assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices’. Iran ratified the 
NPT in 1970. For a comprehensive technical analysis of Stuxnet, see Symantec’s N Falliere, L O Murchu 
and E Chien, ‘W32. Stuxnet Dossier’, Version 1.4, February 2011 
<www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/w32_stuxnet_dossie
r.pdf>. Iran claims that its uranium enrichment programme is for purely civilian purposes. 
3 I Barzashka, ‘Are Cyber-Weapons Effective? Assessing Stuxnet’s Impact on the Iranian Enrichment 
Programme’ (2013) 158(2) RUSI Journal 50, 55. 
4 ‘US general warns over Iranian cyber-soldiers’, BBC News Technology, 18 January 2013, 
<www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-21075781>. 
5 Symantec, ‘W32. DuQu – The Precursor to the Next Stuxnet’, 23 November 2011 
<www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/w32_duqu_the_prec
ursor_to_the_next_stuxnet.pdf>. 
6 E Nakashima, G Miller and J Tate, ‘U.S., Israel developed Flame computer virus to slow down Iranian 
nuclear efforts, officials say’, The Washington Post, 19 June 2012 
<http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-06-19/world/35460741_1_stuxnet-computer-virus-malware>. 
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sophistication of Flame and DuQu and, in the case of Stuxnet, also its consequences on 
the Natanz facility have raised claims that States could be behind the incidents, in 
particular Israel and the United States: it has been reported that cyber efforts to disrupt 
the Iranian nuclear programme, code-named ‘Operation Olympic Games’, started in 
2006 during the Bush Administration with Israel’s cooperation and were expanded by 
President Obama.8 
Using the above cyber operations as a case-study, and assuming that States were 
indeed responsible for them, this article discusses if and when States can engage in 
cyber operations against other States in order to prevent the proliferation of nuclear 
weapons.9 This article, then, does not deal with remedies against cyber operations, but 
focuses on the use of cyber operations against violations of non-proliferation 
agreements, in particular the NPT. Furthermore, this article does not aim to establish 
what primary rules were breached by the above cyber operations – a question that will 
be dealt with only incidentally - but rather approaches the matter from a secondary rules 
perspective and discusses whether their illegality may be excluded on the basis of the 
                                                                                                                                                                          
7 On the standard of evidence required for attribution of cyber operations, in particular with regard to the 
exercise of self-defence against such operations, see M Roscini, Cyber Operations and the Use of Force 
in International Law (OUP 2014) XXX; N Tsagourias, ‘Cyber Attacks, Self-Defence and the Problem of 
Attribution’ (2012) 17 Journal of Conflict and Security Law 235. 
8 DE Sanger, ‘Obama Order Sped Up Wave of Cyberattacks Against Iran’, The New York Times, 1 June 
2012 <www.nytimes.com/2012/06/01/world/middleeast/obama-ordered-wave-of-cyberattacks-against-
iran.html?_r=0)>. 
9 The present article, then, only focuses on cyber operations conducted by States, and does not deal with 
cyber crime or cyber terrorism. 
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relevant circumstances precluding wrongfulness.10 The article starts by distinguishing 
between cyber attacks and cyber exploitation and by discussing their respective possible 
role as counterproliferation measures.11 It subsequently analyses whether and under 
what conditions counterproliferation cyber operations can be justified as 
countermeasures. Section 4 investigates whether counterproliferation cyber operations 
amounting to a use of force are submitted to a more lenient legal regime than other 
forms of the use of force in international relations and whether Stuxnet could be 
qualified as a self-defence measure. Finally, Section 5 examines the legality of 
counterproliferation cyber operations from the perspective of Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter, and in particular of the resolutions adopted against Iran by the Security 
Council. 
 
2. Cyber Attacks, Cyber Exploitation and the Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 
 
                                                          
10 While primary rules provide for substantive rights and obligations, secondary rules determine the 
consequences of the violation of primary rules. See R Ago, Second Report on State Responsibility - The 
Origin of International Responsibility, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1970, Vol II, 179. 
This article will not deal with consent, force majeure, distress and necessity as circumstances precluding 
wrongfulness as they are not relevant in the present context. 
11 ‘Counterproliferation’ consists of ‘efforts either to preclude specific actors from obtaining WMD 
[weapons of mass destruction]-related material and technologies or to degrade and destroy an actor’s 
existing WMD capability’ (DH Joyner, International Law and the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass 
Destruction (OUP 2009) 250). 
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Cyber operations conducted by States include both cyber attacks and cyber 
exploitation.12 Cyber attacks could be standalone operations or be used in conjunction 
with a subsequent kinetic or cyber attack, and could occur in peacetime as well as in 
time of armed conflict.13 A cyber attack may go from relatively innocuous operations 
such as website defacement to acts that cause havoc in military campaigns by 
generating misinformation, or acts resulting in major disruption of services and even 
physical damage to property, loss of lives and bodily injury. In all cases, a cyber attack 
involves an action, either in offence or in defence, delivered in or through cyberspace, 
that targets either an information system or an infrastructure control system.14 The 
former contains information but do not operate physical infrastructures, hence an attack 
on them causes loss, alteration or corruption of data but does not directly result in loss 
of functionality or material damage. The latter, of which a common type is Supervisory 
Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems, operate infrastructures: if corrupted, 
the consequence may be malfunction or even physical damage.15 For security reasons, 
SCADAs, including that used at Natanz, are normally ‘air gapped’ from the internet and 
the attack can only be delivered from within the closed network or through local 
installation of malware by agents that have close access to the system, for instance 
through flash drives. 
                                                          
12 On the taxonomy and classification of cyber operations, see Roscini (n 7) XXX. 
13 Even though a ‘cyber attack’ might be an ‘armed attack’ in the sense of Art 51 of the UN Charter or an 
‘attack’ under Art 49(1) of Protocol I Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions on the Protection of 
Victims of War, care should be taken not to see these expressions as coterminous. 
14 J Ricou Heaton, ‘Civilians at War: Reexamining the Status of Civilians Accompanying the Armed 
Forces’ (2005) 57 Air Force Law Review 161. 
15 Ricou Heaton (n 14) 161. 
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Cyber exploitation is hereby intended as the unauthorized access to computers, 
computer systems or networks in order to exfiltrate information, but without affecting 
the functionality of the accessed system or altering, deleting or corrupting the data or 
software resident therein.16 As has been observed, ‘[t]he primary technical difference 
between cyber attack and cyberexploitation is in the nature of the payload to be 
executed – a cyber attack payload is destructive whereas a cyberexploitation payload 
acquires information nondestructively.’17 Although they are often labeled in the press as 
‘cyber attacks’, then, cyber exploitation operations are different in that they do not 
affect the system’s operation. They focus on intelligence collection, surveillance and 
reconnaissance rather than on disruption and can be preliminary to a kinetic or cyber 
attack that they aim to enable, for instance by collecting information about the 
architecture of the attacked network (network mapping) or operating system 
(footprinting) or by identifying previously unknown vulnerabilities.18 Stealing security 
                                                          
16 Roscini (n 7) XXX. 
17 HS Lin, ‘Offensive Cyber Operations and the Use of Force’ (2010) 4 Journal of National Security Law 
and Policy 64. 
18 Intelligence is ‘any information concerning enemy forces and activities, as well as information 
necessary to facilitate one’s own operations’. Surveillance is ‘the systematic observation of areas, places, 
persons, or things, by visual, aural, electronic, photographic, or other means.’ Reconnaissance is ‘a single 
mission undertaken to obtain – by visual observation or other detection methods – specific information 
about the activities and resources of an enemy’ (Harvard Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict 
Research (HPCR), Manual on International Law Applicable to Air and Missile Warfare (CUP 2013) 320-
321). 
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data or intellectual property from governments and corporations could also be an aim in 
itself and is a major threat to national security and commerce.19 
Both cyber attacks and cyber exploitation could be employed as 
counterproliferation tools in alternative to, or together with, more traditional means. 
Cyber attacks, for instance, could be used to incapacitate the air defence networks of the 
proliferator in support of aerial monitoring of compliance with non-proliferation 
agreements.20 Cyber attacks could also be used to enable a subsequent kinetic attack for 
counterproliferation purposes, as in the case of Israel’s bombing of a Syrian nuclear 
facility in 2007, which was preceded by a cyber attack that neutralized ground radars 
and anti-aircraft batteries.21 Finally, States could conduct cyber attacks to directly 
damage or disrupt the facilities where nuclear weapons are being manufactured or, if the 
State in question has already acquired nuclear weapons, to attack other national critical 
infrastructure (NCI) in order to persuade it to disarm. Stuxnet was allegedly designed to 
                                                          
19 As has been noted, ‘the cyber context changes the scale and consequences of theft and espionage to a 
degree that can result in harm to the country at least as severe as a physical attack.’(J Goldsmith, ‘How 
Cyber Changes the Laws of War’ (2013) 24 EJIL 133). As a consequence of the cyber intrusions 
allegedly originating from China, the US government adopted a new strategy to combat intellectual 
property theft (White House, Administration Strategy on Mitigating the Theft of U.S. Trade Secrets, 
February 2013, 
<www.whitehouse.gov//sites/default/files/omb/IPEC/admin_strategy_on_mitigating_the_theft_of_u.s._tr
ade_secrets.pdf>, on which see DP Fidler, ‘Economic Cyber Espionage and International Law: 
Controversies Involving Government Acquisition of Trade Secrets through Cyber Technologies’, ASIL 
Insights, vol 17, issue 10 (20 March 2013). 
20 JK Kleffner and HA Harrison Dinniss, ‘Keeping the Cyber Peace: International Legal Aspects of Cyber 
Activities in Peace Operations’ (2013) 89 International Law Studies 532. 
21 H Harrison Dinniss, Cyber Warfare and the Laws of War (CUP 2012) 7. 
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slow down Iran’s nuclear programme by affecting the gas centrifuges at the Natanz 
uranium enrichment facility. Unlike other malware, the worm did not limit itself to self-
replicate, but also contained a ‘weaponised’ payload designed to give instructions to 
other programs22 and is, in fact, the first known use of malicious software designed to 
produce material damage by attacking the SCADA system of a NCI.23 Stuxnet 
presumably infiltrated the Natanz system through laptops and USB drives as, for 
security reasons, the system is not usually connected to the internet, and had two 
components: one designed to force a change in the centrifuges’ rotor speed, inducing 
excessive vibrations or distortions that would destroy the centrifuges, and one that 
recorded the normal operations of the plant and then sent them back to plant operators 
so to make it look as everything was functioning normally.24 Although the exact 
consequences of the incident are still the object of debate, the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA) reported that, in the period when Stuxnet was active, Iran 
stopped feeding uranium into a significant number of gas centrifuges at Natanz.25 It is 
                                                          
22 J Richmond, ‘Evolving Battlefields: Does Stuxnet Demonstrate a Need for Modifications to the Law of 
Armed Conflict?’ (2011-2012) 35 Fordham International Law Journal 849. 
23 See T Rid, ‘Cyber War Will Not Take Place’ (2012) 35 Journal of Strategic Studies 17-20. 
24 WJ Broad, J Markoff and DE Sanger, ‘Israeli Test on Worm Called Crucial in Iran Nuclear Delay’, The 
New York Times, 15 January 2011 <www.cfr.org/iran/nyt-israeli-test-worm-called-crucial-iran-nuclear-
delay/p23850>. 
25 WJ Broad, ‘Report Suggests Problems with Iran’s Nuclear Effort’, The New York Times, 23 
November 2010 <www.nytimes.com/2010/11/24/world/middleeast/24nuke.html>. 
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still unclear, however, whether this was due to Stuxnet or to technical malfunctions 
inherent to the equipment used.26 
Cyber exploitation may also be employed as a counterproliferation tool in at least 
two ways: to verify compliance with non-proliferation agreements and to enable a 
counterproliferation kinetic or cyber attack. As to the latter, cyber exploitation could for 
instance be used for target acquisition, network mapping, footprinting and to identify 
the defences of the proliferator State. It appears, for instance, that Flame and DuQu 
were designed to obtain information that could be used to attack industrial control 
systems. Flame, in particular, collected information about the infected system and 
network, recording network connections, searching and exporting files, capturing 
screenshots and key strokes, scanning for locally available Bluetooth devices and even 
recording environment audio.27 It is entirely possible that Flame and DuQu worked 
together with Stuxnet for the same goal: slowing down Iran’s nuclear programme.  
Cyber exploitation may also be used to collect information about the nuclear 
programme of the suspected proliferator.28 The US Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
(FISA) Amendments Act of 2008, for instance, allows the FISA Court to authorize ‘the 
targeting of persons reasonably believed to be located outside the United States to 
                                                          
26 K Ziolkowski, ‘Stuxnet – Legal Considerations’, NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of 
Excellence (CCDCOE), 2012, 5; Barzashka (n 3) 52. 
27 ‘FAQ on Flame’, International Telecommunication Union Articles, 18 June 2012, 
<www.itu.int/cybersecurity/Articles/FAQs_on_FLAME.pdf>. 
28 The problem of collecting intelligence with regard to WMD proliferation has been highlighted by MC 
Waxman ‘The Use of Force Against States That Might Have Weapons of Mass Destruction’ (2009-2010) 
31 Michigan Journal of International Law 15-21. 
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acquire foreign intelligence information’,29 where ‘foreign intelligence’ includes 
‘information that relates to […] the international proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction by a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power’.30 As has been observed, 
‘software agents can be introduced into a collection target’s computer system that can 
scan all accessible files for certain keywords (e.g., “nuclear” in the appropriate local 
language) and e-mail those files in encrypted form to an address controlled by U.S. 
intelligence services’.31 
While cyber attacks like Stuxnet are, as a minimum, a violation of the sovereignty 
of the target State and, when accompanied by a coercive intent, also an intervention in 
its internal affairs,32 the legality of intelligence gathering is a matter of debate. While it 
is true, for instance, that espionage is not prohibited per se by international law although 
it is usually criminalised at domestic level,33 it may be an internationally wrongful act 
when it entails the unauthorized presence of a foreign organ or agent in the territory of 
                                                          
29 Section 702, 50 USC § 1881a(a). 
30 50 USC § 1801(e)(1). See E Lichtblau, ‘In Secret, Court Vastly Broadens Powers of N.S.A.’, The New 
York Times, 6 July 2013, <www.nytimes.com/2013/07/07/us/in-secret-court-vastly-broadens-powers-of-
nsa.html?_r=0>. 
31 WA Owens, KW Dam, and HS Lin (eds), Technology, Policy, Law, and Ethics Regarding U.S. 
Acquisition and Use of Cyberattack Capabilities (The National Academies Press 2009), 190. 
32 Roscini (n 7) XXX. On Stuxnet as a use of force, see below, Section 4. 
33 Y Dinstein, ‘Computer Network Attacks and Self-Defense’ (2002) 76 International Law Studies 101; 
RW Aldrich, ‘How Do You Know You Are at War in the Information Age?’ (1999-2000) 22 Houston 
Journal of International Law 252; DP Fidler, ‘Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Duqu: Why cyberespionage is more 
dangerous than you think’ (2012) 5 International Journal of Critical Infrastructure Protection 28; D Fleck, 
‘Individual and State Responsibility for Intelligence Gathering’ (2007) 28 Michigan Journal of 
International Law 688. 
 12
another State and, therefore, a violation of its sovereignty.34 The Group of Experts that 
drafted the Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare could 
not achieve consensus on ‘whether the placement of malware that causes no physical 
damage (as with malware used to monitor activities) constitutes a violation of 
sovereignty’.35 One of the experts, however, has suggested that it may be a violation of 
the sovereignty of the targeted State when the cyber operation entails an unauthorized 
intrusion into cyber infrastructure located in another State (be it governmental or 
private).36 If this conclusion is correct, DuQu and Flame (if attributed to a State) would 
also be internationally wrongful acts. 
                                                          
34 Q Wright, ‘Legal Aspects of the U-2 Incident’ (1960) 54 AJIL 844; Fleck (n 33) 707. In Nicaragua, the 
ICJ found that the US reconnaissance flights breached Nicaragua’s sovereignty as a result of their trespass 
into Nicaraguan airspace (Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v 
United States), Judgment, Merits, 27 June 1986, ICJ Reports 1986, para 91). Certain intelligence 
gathering may also be inconsistent with international human rights law, such as Art 12 of the 1948 UN 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Art 17 of the 1966 UN International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights. 
35 Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare (CUP 2013) 16. 
36 W Heintschel von Heinegg, ‘Territorial Sovereignty and Neutrality in Cyberspace’ (2013) 89 
International Law Studies 129. More cautiously, an early study of the US Department of Defense 
concluded that ‘[a]n unauthorized electronic intrusion into another nation’s computer systems may very 
well end up being regarded as a violation of the victim’s sovereignty. It may even be regarded as 
equivalent to a physical trespass into a nation’s territory, but such issues have yet to be addressed in the 
international community. […] If an unauthorized computer intrusion can be reliably characterized as 
intentional and it can be attributed to the agents of another nation, the victim nation will at least have the 
right to protest, probably with some confidence of obtaining a sympathetic hearing in the world 
community’ (US Department of Defense, An Assessment of International Legal Issues in Information 
Operations, May 1999, <www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/dod-io-legal/dod-io-legal.pdf>). On the other 
 13
It should be recalled that several nuclear arms control and non-proliferation 
agreements provide for ‘national technical means of verification’ of compliance.37 
Indeed, ‘[i]n the absence of any multilateral capacity to evaluate threats from and 
calibrate responses to the dangers of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism, 
international organizations will be forced to rely on intelligence their member states 
provide’.38 By ratifying the relevant treaties, the States Parties accept not to interfere 
with such activities by other Parties.39 It is difficult, however, to qualify cyber 
exploitation, and in particular Flame and DuQu, as a lawful national technical means of 
verification, for two reasons. Firstly, the NPT does not provide for such mechanisms. 
Secondly, as Article IV(A)(5) of the CTBT makes clear, national means of verification 
must be used ‘in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of 
international law, including that of respect for the sovereignty of States’.40 They 
therefore essentially include remote sensing, for instance through satellite 
reconnaissance, but not territorially intrusive activities.41 
                                                                                                                                                                          
hand, Doswald-Beck argues that, when the individual conducts intelligence gathering from outside the 
adversary’s territory through cyber exploitation, ‘the situation should be no different from someone 
gathering data from a spy satellite’ (L Doswald-Beck, ‘Some Thoughts on Computer Network Attack and 
the International Law of Armed Conflict’ (2002) 76 International Law Studies 172). 
37 See, eg, Art IV(A)(5) of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). On national technical 
means of verification, see S Chesterman ‘The Spy Who Came from the Cold War: Intelligence and 
International Law’ (2006) 27 Michigan Journal of International Law 1090-1093. 
38 Chesterman (n 37) 1129. 
39 See Art IV(A)(6) of the CTBT. 
40 See also, inter alia, Art XII(1) of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. 
41 M Bothe, ‘Verification of Facts’, Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (OUP 2012), 
vol X, 654. 
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3. Cyber Operations as Countermeasures Against the Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons 
 
Even when inconsistent with certain primary norms, the illegality of the 
counterproliferation cyber operations might be precluded if they amount to 
countermeasures aimed to stop the continuation of the wrongful act and to provide 
reparation (Article 22 of the Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts, adopted by the International Law Commission (ILC) in 2001 and 
endorsed by the UN General Assembly (hereinafter ‘ILC Articles’)).42 If acts of 
retorsion, i.e. unfriendly acts not involving any breach of international law, can be 
adopted at any time, countermeasures are ‘measures that would otherwise be contrary to 
the international obligations of an injured State vis-à-vis the responsible State, if they 
were not taken by the former in response to an internationally wrongful act by the latter 
in order to procure cessation and reparation’.43  
It does not seem that Article 55 of the ILC Articles, according to which the 
Articles apply only if special rules do not exist, plays a significant role in the present 
context: the non-compulsory character of the NPT’s institutional framework for 
compliance does not deprive the injured States (if there are any) of their right to adopt 
                                                          
42 Text in Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2001, vol II, Part Two, 16ff. See also Rule 9, 
Tallinn Manual (n 35) 36. 
43 ILC, Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts – General Commentary (‘ILC 
Commentary’), Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2001, vol II, Part Two, 128. 
 15
countermeasures under general international law.44 The invocation of countermeasures 
as a circumstance precluding wrongfulness, however, is subordinated to the presence of 
certain requirements that will be examined in the following pages. 
 
A. The Previous Commission of an Internationally Wrongful Act by the Targeted 
State 
 
To be lawful, countermeasures can only be undertaken by the injured State(s) in 
reaction to a previous internationally wrongful act attributable to the targeted State.45 
Counterproliferation cyber countermeasures, therefore, presuppose that the conduct of 
the targeted State amounts to a violation of its non-proliferation obligations under a 
treaty or customary international law.46 The development, manufacture or acquisition of 
nuclear weapons is not prohibited by customary international law. Indeed, the ICJ found 
that ‘[t]he emergence, as lex lata, of a customary rule specifically prohibiting the use of 
nuclear weapons as such is hampered by the continuing tensions between the nascent 
opinio juris on the one hand, and the still strong adherence to the practice of deterrence 
                                                          
44 M Happold, ‘The “Injured State” in Case of Breach of a Non-proliferation Treaty and the Legal 
Consequences of Such Breach’, in DH Joyner and M Roscini (eds), Non-proliferation Law as a Special 
Regime (CUP 2012) 192-194; S Singh, ‘Non-proliferation Law and Countermeasures’, ibid, 223-224. 
45 Case concerning the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v. Slovakia), Judgment, 25 September 
1997, ICJ Reports 1997, para 83. 
46 In Nicaragua, the ICJ found that ‘in international law there are no rules, other than such rules as may 
be accepted by the State concerned, by treaty or otherwise, whereby the level of armaments of a sovereign 
State can be limited, and this principle is valid for all States without exception’ (Nicaragua (n 34) para 
269). 
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on the other’.47 If this is correct for the use of nuclear weapons, the conclusion must 
hold even truer for the mere development and possession of such weapons. Indications 
of the non-customary status of the NPT are North Korea’s withdrawal from the treaty, 
the UN Security Council’s demands that it retracts its withdrawal48 and the non-
ratification of India, Pakistan and Israel. 
The possession and acquisition of nuclear weapons, however, are prohibited by 
the NPT (for certain States) and by the treaties establishing nuclear weapon-free zones 
(NWFZs) in some regions of the world.49 In the case of Iran (a State Party to the NPT), 
it has not yet been conclusively established that the Islamic Republic is engaging in 
activities in breach of Article II of the NPT. In fact, if one interprets the term 
‘manufacture’ not as including any activity that might lead to proliferation but only 
design and construction of warheads, there is no evidence in support of such 
conclusion.50 Iran’s past conduct in not fulfilling its obligations under the safeguards 
agreement with the IAEA may have constituted non-compliance with that agreement:51 
                                                          
47 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 8 July 1996, ICJ Reports 1996, 
para 73. 
48 SC Res 1874 (2009). 
49 Five treaties establishing NWFZs have been concluded so far: the 1967 Treaty of Tlatelolco with 
regard to Latin America and the Caribbean, the 1985 Treaty of Rarotonga on the South Pacific Ocean, the 
1995 Bangkok Treaty with respect to South-East Asia, the 1996 Pelindaba Treaty in relation to Africa and 
the 2006 Semipalatinsk Treaty on Central Asia. All five treaties have now entered into force. The text of 
the treaties can be found at <www.opanal.org>. 
50 Joyner (n 11) 16-17. 
51 INFCIRC/214, 13 December 1974, 
<www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/infcirc214.pdf>. Para 5 of SC Res 1929 (2010) 
also ‘calls upon Iran to act strictly in accordance with the provisions of the Additional Protocol to its 
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this non-compliance, however, is limited to the safeguards agreement and does not 
automatically constitute a breach of Article III of the NPT, which merely requires States 
Parties to enter into a safeguards agreement with the IAEA.52 On the other hand, it is 
not controversial that Iran has breached Security Council resolutions requiring it to 
suspend all uranium enrichment-related activities.53 Whether the Security Council can 
deprive a State of an ‘inalienable’ right like that to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy is 
a complicated issue that is outside the scope of this article.54 
 
B. The State ‘Injured’ by the Wrongful Act 
 
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that Iran did (or will) commit an internationally 
wrongful act by breaching its nuclear non-proliferation obligations, it is only the 
‘injured States’ that are entitled to claim the full spectrum of the consequences of State 
                                                                                                                                                                          
IAEA Safeguards Agreement that it signed on 18 December 2003’. As Iran has not ratified the Protocol, 
its binding effects on the Islamic Republic rest on Art 25 of the UN Charter. On 11 November 2013, Iran 
signed a Joint Statement on Framework for Cooperation with the IAEA 
(<www.iaea.org/newscenter/pressreleases/2013/prn201321.html>). See also the measures of cooperation 
agreed in the Joint Plan of Action signed by the P5+1 and Iran on 24 November 2013 (text at 
<www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/nov/24/iran-nuclear-deal-joint-plan-
action?CMP=twt_gu>). 
52 DH Joyner, Interpreting the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (OUP 2011) 88-89. 
53 See, in particular, SC Res 1696 (2006) and 1737 (2006). 
54 The Joint Plan of Action signed by the P5+1 and Iran on 24 November 2013 (above (n 51)) recognizes 
Iran’s right to enrich uranium, which raises the question whether such agreement is in breach of SC Res 
1696 (2006) and 1737 (2006) and, if so, with what consequences. 
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responsibility, including the right to adopt countermeasures. According to Article 42 of 
the ILC Articles, 
 
[a] State is entitled as an injured State to invoke the responsibility of another 
State if the obligation breached is owed to:  
(a) that State individually; or  
(b) a group of States including that State, or the international community as 
a whole, and the breach of the obligation:  
(i) specially affects that State; or  
(ii) is of such a character as radically to change the position of all the other 
States to which the obligation is owed with respect to the further 
performance of the obligation. 
 
NPT obligations are obviously of a collective character. As there is no ‘specially 
affected State’ in case of their breach, States Parties would be injured only if NPT 
obligations qualify as ‘integral’ (or ‘interdependent’) obligations according to Article 
42(b)(ii) of the ILC Articles. Integral obligations operate ‘in an all-or-nothing 
fashion’:55 even though they pursue a collective interest of the group, ‘each parties’ 
performance is effectively conditioned upon and requires the performance of the 
                                                          
55 J Crawford, Fourth Report on State Responsibility, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 
2001, Vol II, Part One, 10. 
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other’.56 As Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice put it, ‘the obligation of each party to disarm, or not 
to exceed a certain level of armaments, or not to manufacture or possess certain types of 
weapons, is necessarily dependent on a corresponding performance of the same thing by 
all the other parties, since it is the essence of such a treaty that the undertaking of each 
party is given in return for a similar undertaking by the others’.57 
Due to the peculiar asymmetric character of the NPT regime, which distinguishes 
between nuclear weapon States and non-nuclear weapon States, it may however be 
difficult to argue that its non-proliferation obligations are integral under the law of State 
responsibility. Indeed, if one interprets Article 42(b)(ii) as referring only to ‘a 
modification which affects the future performance of the specific obligations in 
question’ by all the other Parties,58 it can be doubted that the obligations not to 
manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons under Article II of the NPT are of an 
integral character: as has been suggested, their breach by a State Party ‘would not 
undermine or modify the position of all other States to which the obligation is owed, 
with respect to the future performance of that same specific obligation’, because such 
obligations do not apply to the nuclear weapon States Parties to the NPT.59 Note the 
                                                          
56 Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its fifty-third session, Yearbook of the 
International Law Commission, 2001, Vol II, Part Two, 119. The Commission included disarmament and 
nuclear free zone treaties among the examples of this type of obligations. 
57 G Fitzmaurice, Second Report on the Law of Treaties, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 
1957, Vol II, 54. 
58 G Gaja, ‘The Concept of an Injured State’ in J Crawford, A Pellet and S Olleson (eds) The Law of 
International Responsibility (OUP 2010) 946 (emphasis added). 
59 S Singh, ‘Iran, the Nuclear Issue and Countermeasures’, 4 <www.dipublico.com.ar/english/iran-the-
nuclear-issue-countermeasures/> (emphasis in the original, underlining and bold omitted). Of course, 
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difference with Article 60(2)(c) of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 
Under this provision, States may suspend in whole or in part the operation of a treaty 
with respect to themselves in case of a material breach by a State Party ‘if the treaty is 
of such a character that a material breach of its provisions by one party radically 
changes the position of every party with respect to the further performance of its 
obligations under the treaty’. This provision refers to a modification ‘which affects the 
totality of obligations deriving from the treaty’,60 not only the performance of the same 
specific obligation as in Article 42(b)(ii) of the ILC Articles, and would therefore apply 
to material breaches of the NPT. Under Article 60, however, a State could only suspend 
the same treaty in reaction to a material breach of its provisions, and not commit other 
violations of international law, such as unlawful cyber operations. 
If one accepts the interpretation according to which it is only the obligation to 
conclude a safeguards agreement with the IAEA, and not also that to comply with it, 
which has been collectivized through Article III of the NPT, the obligation to fully 
apply safeguards is of a bilateral character. In such case, the only party injured by its 
violation would be the IAEA, with which the agreement was concluded. As has been 
observed, ‘just as for States, whether an organization is an injured subject depends on 
the participation of the organization in a primary legal relationship’, which is certainly 
the case ‘where the breached obligation results from a bilateral treaty to which the 
                                                                                                                                                                          
when it is obligations contained in other non-proliferation treaties that are allegedly breached, the 
conclusion may be different. For instance, the main provisions contained in NWFZ treaties are of an 
integral character (M Roscini, ‘Something Old, Something New: The 2006 Semipalatinsk Treaty on a 
Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia’ (2008) 7 Chinese Journal of International Law 611). 
60 Gaja (n 58) 946 (emphasis added). 
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organization is a party’.61 But even if non-compliance with IAEA safeguards was 
considered also a breach of Article III(1), this would still not entitle the NPT States 
Parties to adopt countermeasures as injured States, for the same reasons explained 
above with regard to Article II, ie because its breach would not affect the position of all 
other Parties with respect to the performance of the same obligation.62 
Finally, the violation of the Security Council resolutions requiring Iran to stop all 
uranium enrichment activities translates into a breach of Article 25 of the UN Charter, 
according to which ‘[t]he Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out 
the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter’. Strictly 
speaking, this is a breach of a provision contained in a treaty establishing an 
international organization which, in the present case, indirectly imposes an obligation, 
that of suspending uranium enrichment, related to non-proliferation. It is doubtful that 
UN Member States may adopt unilateral countermeasures against a State that is the 
object of mandatory sanctions decided by the Security Council. But even be that as it 
may, the NPT States Parties would still not be entitled to adopt countermeasures in 
reaction to the violation of the Security Council resolutions on Iran under the law of 
State responsibility. Indeed, Article 25 of the UN Charter is an erga omnes partes 
obligation owed to all other UN Member States:63 for this type of obligations, Article 
42(b)(i) of the ILC Articles prescribes that, although all Member States have a legal 
interest in the fulfilment of the obligation, only those ‘specially affected’ by the breach 
                                                          
61 Eglantine Cujo, ‘Invocation of Responsibility by International Organizations’, in Crawford, Pellet and 
Olleson (n 58) 970-971. 
62 See, for an alternative view, Happold (n 44) 184-185. 
63 See Prosecutor v Blaskić, Judgment on the Request of the Republic of Croatia for Review of the 
Decision of Trial Chamber II of 18 July 1997, ICTY, Appeals Chamber, 28 October 1997, para 26. 
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are injured States and are thus entitled to adopt countermeasures under Article 49.64 In 
the present case, there are no States ‘specially affected’ by the breach of Article 25 of 
the UN Charter as a consequence of the continuation of the Iranian uranium enrichment 
programme. 
If the NPT States Parties were not ‘injured’ by Iran’s conduct, then, it should be 
demonstrated that they can otherwise invoke the responsibility of the author of the 
breach, including the right to adopt countermeasures. Article 54 of the ILC Articles 
notoriously leaves the problem unresolved and provides that, in case of obligations of a 
collective character, any States ‘other than the injured States’, to which the collective 
obligation is owed, can take ‘lawful measures’ against the wrongdoing State ‘to ensure 
cessation of the breach and reparation in the interest of the injured State or of the 
beneficiaries of the obligation breached’, but without specifying whether ‘lawful 
measures’ include countermeasures.65 Assuming arguendo that this is the case, and if 
compliance with IAEA safeguards agreements is indeed a bilateral obligation, Article 
54 would not apply, as, by referring to Article 48(1) of the ILC Articles, this provision 
only becomes relevant in case of collective obligations.66 If, however, one considers the 
obligation to comply with IAEA safeguards agreements collectivized through Article III 
of the NPT, the IAEA would be the international organization in the interest of which to 
                                                          
64 This conclusion would not change should one consider Art 25 as an erga omnes obligation due to the 
universal character of the UN Charter and its membership. 
65 The ILC Commentary explains that Art 54 ‘reserves the position and leaves the resolution of the matter 
to the further development of international law’ (ILC Commentary (n 43) 139). 
66 Art 48 (1) of the ILC Articles applies when ‘(a) the obligation breached is owed to a group of States 
including that State, and is established for the protection of a collective interest of the group; or (b) the 
obligation breached is owed to the international community as a whole’.  
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adopt ‘lawful measures’, but arguably a precondition should be that non-compliance 
with the safeguards agreement has been established by the Agency, something which 
has not occurred with regard to Iran. As to breaches of Article II of the NPT, Article 54 
is difficult to apply as there would be no injured States in the interest of which other 
affected States could adopt countermeasures and it is difficult to see who the 
‘beneficiaries’ of the breached obligation could be. Finally, at least in case of breaches 
of Security Council resolutions, there is a strong argument in favour of suspending the 
right of non-injured States to take unilateral countermeasures when the Security Council 
has imposed mandatory sanctions against the wrongdoer. As Sicilianos explains, ‘the 
triggering of Chapter VII ends the power of States not individually injured to react as 
they please at the individual level’.67 ‘Collective countermeasures’, i.e. measures 
adopted by non-injured States in response to violations of erga omnes obligations, can 
exclusively be adopted if the Security Council fails to act. If that is not the case, non-
injured States can only adopt those measures ‘which are necessary and sufficient for the 
execution of those mandatory sanctions’.68 
In light of the above, it is not possible to conclude that the United States 
(assuming that it was responsible for Stuxnet, Flame and DuQu) was ‘injured’ by Iran’s 
                                                          
67 L-A Sicilianos, ‘Countermeasures in Response to Grave Violations of Obligations Owed to the 
International Community’ in Crawford, Pellet and Olleson (n 58) 1142. See also the comments by A 
Pellet on the Fourth Report of the Special Rapporteur on State Responsibility, Yearbook of the 
International Law Commission, 1992, Vol I, 144; and P-E Dupont, ‘Countermeasures and Collective 
Security: The Case of the EU Sanctions Against Iran’ (2012) 17 Journal of Conflict and Security Law 
333. Contra, see NJ Calamita, ‘Sanctions, Countermeasures, and the Iranian Nuclear Issue’ (2009) 42 
Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 1438-1440. 
68 Sicilianos (n 67) 1142. 
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non-compliance with IAEA safeguards or Security Council resolutions, or that it was 
entitled to adopt countermeasures, including cyber operations, under Article 54. The 
result would not change in case of violation of Articles II or III(1) of the NPT by Iran. 
These conclusions apply even more strongly to Israel, which is not even a State Party to 
the NPT. 
 
C. Conditions Related to the Adoption of Countermeasures 
 
States adopting countermeasures also have to comply with the requirements provided in 
Part Three, Chapter II of the ILC Articles that reflect customary international law. In 
particular, the injured State must first call upon the responsible State to discontinue the 
internationally wrongful act or provide reparation69 and, apart from the case of ‘urgent 
countermeasures’,70 must notify it of the decision to take countermeasures and offer to 
negotiate.71 This did not occur with regard to Stuxnet, DuQu and Flame. An obligation 
to notify cyber countermeasures, however, is probably unrealistic, as it deprives the 
operations of one of their main advantages, ie their anonymity and covert character. 
Also, if the injured State notifies its intention to adopt cyber countermeasures, the 
wrongdoing State may immunize itself by reinforcing its active and passive cyber 
defences. Having said that, ‘[t]he injured State need not specify the content or timing of 
                                                          
69 Art 52(1)(a) of the ILC Articles on State Responsibility. 
70 Art 52(2) of the ILC Articles on State Responsibility. 
71 Art 52(1)(b) of the ILC Articles on State Responsibility. 
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the measures’.72 Article 52(1)(b) of the ILC Articles, therefore, still leaves some room 
for covert countermeasures, including cyber ones. 
The purpose of the countermeasure must be to ensure compliance with 
international law and the measure must be ‘as far as possible’ reversible, i.e. ‘taken in 
such a way as to permit the resumption of performance of the obligations in question’.73 
Indeed, as the ILC Commentary explains, ‘inflicting irreparable damage on the 
responsible State could amount to punishment or a sanction for non-compliance, not a 
countermeasure as conceived in the [ILC] Articles’.74 Therefore, ‘if the injured State has 
a choice between a number of lawful and effective countermeasures, it should select one 
which permits the resumption of the performance of the obligation suspended as a result 
of countermeasures’.75 From this perspective, a Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) 
campaign, which would only overload the targeted system with multiple requests, may 
be preferable, all being equal, to a cyber attack, like Stuxnet, that employs malware to 
modify, corrupt or alter data or software and that may spread to other systems.76 DDoS 
attacks, however, are unlikely to be an option against nuclear facilities, which, like most 
NCIs, are usually not connected to the internet. In any case, ‘the duty to choose 
                                                          
72 Y Iwasawa and N Iwatsuki, ‘Procedural Conditions’, in Crawford, Olleson and Pellet (n 58) 1152. 
73 Art 49(3) of the ILC Articles on State Responsibility. 
74 ILC Commentary (n 43) 131. 
75 ILC Commentary (n 43) 131. 
76 ‘Botnets’ (short for ‘robot networks’), which are the source of most spam, are networks of infected 
computers hijacked from their unaware owners by external users: linked together, such networks can be 
used to mount massive DDoS attacks. On botnets, see L Vihul, C Czosseck, K Ziolkowski, L Aasmann, 
IA Ivanov, and S Brüggemann, Legal Implications of Countering Botnets, CCDCOE, 2012 
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measures that are reversible is not absolute. It may not be possible in all cases to reverse 
all of the effects of countermeasures after the occasion for taking them has ceased’.77 
Cyber countermeasures must be necessary to ensure the cessation of the wrongful 
act if it is continuing, its non-repetition or full reparation in its various forms.78 A 
corollary of this is that countermeasures ‘must be directed against’ the State responsible 
for the internationally wrongful act.79 In the case of cyber countermeasures, therefore, 
the malware must able to be directed with sufficient accuracy against the wrongdoing 
State.80 Otherwise, the State acting in countermeasure may become itself the object of 
countermeasures if it breaches the rights of innocent States. Finally, the countermeasure 
must be proportionate, ie ‘commensurate with the injury suffered, taking into account 
the gravity of the internationally wrongful act and the rights in question’.81 Although the 
ILC Commentary states that ‘[c]ountermeasures are more likely to satisfy the 
requirements of necessity and proportionality if they are taken in relation to the same or 
                                                          
77 ILC Commentary (n 43) 131. 
78 Iwasawa and Iwatsuki (n 72) 1153. 
79 Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (n 45) para 83. 
80 This does not mean that third States’ rights cannot be incidentally affected (ILC Commentary (n 43) 
130). 
81 Art 51 of the ILC Articles on State Responsibility. See also Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (n 45), para 
85. The UK Foreign Secretary, for instance, included the ‘need for governments to act proportionately in 
cyberspace and in accordance with national and international law’ in his seven principles for the 
international use of cyberspace (W Hague, Speech at the Munich Security Conference: Security and 
Freedom in the Cyber Age—Seeking the Rules of the Road, 11 February 2011, cited in DJ Ryan, M Dion, 
E Tikk, and JJCH Ryan, ‘International Cyberlaw: A Normative Approach’ (2011) 42 Georgetown Journal 
of International Law 1172). 
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a closely related obligation’,82 they do not necessarily have to be in kind. This is 
particularly important in the case of nuclear non-proliferation obligations, where the 
collective interest is to prevent the general collapse of the regime as a consequence of 
reciprocal violations. The ‘rights in question’ referred to in Article 51 of the ILC 
Articles are not only those of the injured and responsible States:83 the possible spreading 
of the malware to third States, or the consequences on such States of disrupting the 
internet connection of the target State, should also be taken into account when assessing 
the proportionality of the cyber countermeasure.84 Proportionality, however, may be 
difficult to calculate in advance in the cyber context because of the interconnectivity of 
information systems, which causes that malware sent through cyberspace might spread 
uncontrollably. As the ILC Commentary acknowledges, however, ‘what is 
proportionate is not a matter which can be determined precisely’.85 All in all, meeting 
the proportionality criterion is essentially a technical issue: customized cyber 
countermeasures are possible if the software is written with this purpose in mind. The 
code could, for instance, be designed in a way as to be activated only by the presence of 
certain characteristics. This requires a high degree of information on the targeted 
systems, which can be obtained through traditional intelligence collection and/or cyber 
                                                          
82 ILC Commentary (n 43) 129. 
83 The Commentary states that ‘the position of other States which may be affected [by the 
countermeasure] may also be taken into consideration’ (ILC Commentary (n 43) 135). 
84 As the Commentary explains, however, ‘[i]n a situation where a third State is owed an international 
obligation by the State taking countermeasures and that obligation is breached by the countermeasure, the 
wrongfulness of the measure is not precluded as against the third State’ (ILC Commentary (n 43) 130). 
85 ILC Commentary (n 43) 135.  
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exploitation.86 Stuxnet is a good example of such customized cyber operations. Unlike 
most malware, Stuxnet did little harm to computers and networks that did not meet 
specific configuration requirements. While the worm was promiscuous, it made itself 
inert if the specific Siemens software used at Iran’s Natanz enrichment plant was not 
found on infected computers, and contained safeguards to prevent each infected 
computer from spreading the worm to more than three others. The worm was also 
programmed to erase itself on 24 June 2012.87 
Another limit to the adoption of countermeasures is Article 50(1) of the ILC 
Articles, which reflects customary international law and provides that countermeasures 
cannot affect ‘the obligation to refrain from the threat or use of force as embodied in the 
Charter of the United Nations’.88 This point will be explored in the next Section. 
 
4. Counterproliferation Cyber Operations Amounting to a Use of Force 
 
It is outside the scope of this study to engage in an in-depth discussion of when cyber 
operations amount to a use of force under Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, as this has 
                                                          
86 Owens, Dam, and Lin (n 31) 123. 
87 Richmond (n 22) 856. 
88 Other obligations that cannot be affected by countermeasures are obligations for the protection of 
fundamental human rights, obligations of a humanitarian character prohibiting reprisals, obligations 
arising from peremptory norms of general international law, obligations under any dispute settlement 
procedure applicable between it and the responsible state and obligations related to the inviolability of 
diplomatic or consular agents, premises, archives and documents (Art 50 of the ILC Articles on State 
Responsibility). 
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been extensively done elsewhere.89 In two articles published in a special issue on ‘cyber 
war’ of this Journal, Russell Buchan and Nicholas Tsagourias speak for numerous 
scholars when they argue that, if a cyber operation causes physical damage to property 
or persons, it would qualify as a use of force.90 If it was proved that Stuxnet did cause 
physical damage to the gas centrifuges at Natanz and significantly disrupted the 
functioning of the facility, then, it could hardly be doubted that it qualified as a use of 
force under Article 2(4), although arguably not of a scale and effects to also be an 
‘armed attack’ under Article 51.91 
Having said that, one may wonder whether the cyber (instead of kinetic) character 
of the operation and its alleged purpose (nuclear counterproliferation) justify a more 
lenient legal regime than other forms of the use of force in international relations. In this 
regard, an analogy can be made with the threat of force as a policy instrument. In her 
1988 article, Romana Sadurska argues that, although Article 2(4) of the UN Charter 
prohibits both, ‘the threat of force is in actuality treated as a lesser international wrong, 
even if its consequences are comparable to the lasting effects of the use of force’.92 She 
                                                          
89 See, eg, Roscini (n 7) XXX.  
90 R Buchan, ‘Cyber Attacks: Unlawful Use of Force or Prohibited Interventions?’ (2012) 17 Journal of 
Conflict and Security Law 219, 221; Tsagourias, (n 7) 231. See also Tallinn Manual (n 35) 48. 
91 ME O’Connell, ‘Cyber Security without Cyber War’ (2012) 17 Journal of Conflict and Security Law 
201-202. On the scale and effects threshold of ‘armed attack’, see Nicaragua  (n 34) paras 191, 195. On 
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of infrastructures (ibid, XXX). 
92 R Sadurska, ‘Threats of Force’ (1998) 82 AJIL 258. 
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opines that ‘there is no reason to assume that the threat will always be unlawful if in the 
same circumstances the resort to force would be illicit’.93 Taking State practice into 
account, in particular the lack of significant reactions to threats of force, she concludes 
that Article 2(4) is not the only parameter against which the legality of a threat of force 
is assessed by States, which consider threats lawful if: 1) they are made to protect the 
security of the State, providing that the internal self-determination of the target is not 
violated; 2) they are made to vindicate a denied right; 3) they are prudent and balance 
individual and community values.94 If the main purpose of the Charter is the 
preservation of peace and security and not the freedom of States from external pressure 
and if ‘[t]he Charter prohibits the use of force in violation of the political independence 
and territorial integrity of a state because it may lead to international instability, breach 
of the peace and/or massive abuses of human rights’, then there is no reason why the 
threat and the use of force should be treated equally.95 The legal appraisal of the threat 
would be the same as that of the use of force only when they produce comparable 
results, which is not a likely case, as ‘even an effective threat will not have the same 
destructive consequences as the use of force’.96 
Many of Sadurska’s arguments in relation to threats of force could be easily 
extended to cyber attacks when used to enforce international law, in particular non-
proliferation obligations, because of their potentially less lethal character: even when 
they cause some material damage as in the case of Stuxnet, cyber attacks can cause 
                                                          
93 Ibid, 250. 
94 Ibid, 260-266. 
95 Ibid, 250. 
96 Ibid. 
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fewer human casualties (if any) than a kinetic attack. It has been claimed, for instance, 
that the Stuxnet operation was a ‘huge success’ because it was ‘nearly as effective as a 
military strike, but even better since there were no fatalities and no full-blown war’.97 
Cyber operations might then come to be seen as a more subtle approach to pursue 
community objectives such as nuclear weapons counterproliferation and a ‘greater 
opportunity to achieve goals such as retarding the Iranian nuclear programme without 
causing the loss of life or injury to innocent civilians that air strikes would seem more 
likely to inflict’.98 
This argument seems to find support in the fact that, even though Stuxnet has 
allegedly damaged a considerable number of centrifuges in the Natanz uranium 
enrichment plant, there was no significant reaction to it, by the victim State, by those 
suspected of having planned and executed the operation or by the international 
community in general. One commentator has maintained that this silence can be 
interpreted as acquiescence suggesting that ‘states don’t perceive this situation triggered 
the rules on the use of force, armed attack, and aggression’ even though, had the attack 
been carried out by kinetic means, it would have probably been treated differently.99 
According to this view, ‘states, particularly the big cyber-powers, are seeking to 
establish higher use-of-force and armed-attack thresholds for cyber-based actions to 
                                                          
97 Y Katz, ‘Stuxnet Virus Set Back Iran’s Nuclear Program by 2 Years’, Jerusalem Post, 15 December 
2010, <www.jpost.com/Iranian-Threat/News/Stuxnet-virus-set-back-Irans-nuclear-program-by-2-years>. 
98 JP Farwell and R Rohozinski, ‘Stuxnet and the Future of Cyber War’ (2011) 53 Survival: Global 
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permit more room to explore and exploit cybertechnologies as instruments of foreign 
policy and national security’.100 
De lege ferenda, it might well be that the law will develop in the sense of 
allowing cyber operations as a ‘ritualized substitute for violence’101 that States employ 
to restore a minimum legal order, especially when resort to the right of self-defence 
would be dubious. This conclusion, however, is still a speculative one and not 
consistent with the lex lata. At a closer look, the analogy with the threat of force is not 
helpful. Sadurska’s view was disproved by the 1996 Nuclear Weapons Advisory 
Opinion: as the International Court of Justice (ICJ) held, ‘[t]he notions of “threat” and 
“use” of force under Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter stand together in the sense 
that if the use of force itself in a given case is illegal - for whatever reason - the threat to 
use such force will likewise be illegal. In short, if it is to be lawful, the declared 
readiness of a State to use force must be a use of force that is in conformity with the 
Charter’.102 There is also ample practice that proves that States consider the threat of 
force prohibited under the same circumstances as the use of force, even if they do not 
cause direct physical damage.103 
It is also not correct that Stuxnet met with no reaction. Iran, in particular, qualified 
the cyber attack as ‘nuclear terrorism’ and as ‘a grave violation of the principles of the 
UN Charter and international law’, even though it refrained from using explicit jus ad 
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bellum language.104 It also encouraged the Security Council ‘to act against those States 
undertaking cyber attacks and sabotage in the peaceful nuclear facilities’.105 But even be 
that as it may, from a purely methodological perspective silence cannot be interpreted as 
acquiescence in the present case as no State openly acknowledged the responsibility of 
Stuxnet or offered legal justifications for it. It is more likely that the lack of significant 
reactions by the international community was due to non-legal factors. In particular, 
many regional States were certainly not unhappy that Iran’s nuclear programme had 
been delayed. Silence might have also been due to the lack of reliable information about 
the incident and its actual consequences, as well as its uncertain attribution. States might 
have also preferred not to condemn the cyber operation as a ‘use of force’ because they 
are engaging or wish to engage in similar operations themselves. Finally, the absence of 
significant reactions could have been motivated by the fact that the attention of the 
international community was at the time focused on other events, in particular the ‘Arab 
Spring’. 
If Stuxnet did cause some physical damage and was therefore a use of force, it 
would fall under Article 50(1) of the ILC Articles and could not be justified as a lawful 
countermeasure, even if adopted for counterproliferation purposes. Article 21 of the ILC 
Articles, however, provides that ‘[t]he wrongfulness of an act of a State is precluded if 
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the act constitutes a lawful measure of self-defence taken in conformity with the Charter 
of the United Nations’. Article 51 of the UN Charter constitutes an exception to the 
prohibition of the use of force contained in Article 2(4) and provides that the State 
victim of an armed attack or any other State in collective self-defence of the victim 
could use force against the attacker if the armed attack ‘occurs’.106 Any attempt to 
justify Stuxnet as a self-defence measure would run against the fact that, regardless of 
whether or not Iran has breached its non-proliferation obligations under the NPT or 
IAEA safeguards agreements, the acquisition and manufacture of nuclear weapons 
clearly do not amount, per se, to an ‘armed attack’ in the sense of Article 51. Only if 
Iran does acquire those weapons and actually uses them against another State, or – to 
use the Caroline incident’s language - at least is about to do so and there is ‘no choice 
of means, and no moment for deliberation’,107 can the right of self-defence be exercised 
by using force. The claim that self-defence can be invoked against an imminent threat 
of an armed attack, where the imminence is referred to the threat of an armed attack and 
not to the attack itself,108 has no basis in international law. 
 
5. Counterproliferation Cyber Operations and the UN Collective Security System 
 
                                                          
106 See Tallinn Manual (n 35) 54. 
107 Letter from Daniel Webster to Henry S Fox (24 April 1841), 29 British and Foreign State Papers 1137-
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108 H Koh, ‘International Law in Cyberspace’, Speech at the USCYBERCOM Inter-Agency Legal 
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According to Article 59 of the ILC Articles, the Articles are ‘without prejudice to the 
Charter of the United Nations’. Article 103 of the Charter provides that ‘[i]n the event 
of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations under the 
present Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, their 
obligations under the present Charter shall prevail’. Regardless of whether one prefers 
to consider Article 103 as a hierarchy rule and a circumstance precluding 
wrongfulness,109 or as a mere conflict clause,110 in both cases the illegality of Stuxnet, 
DuQu and Flame would be precluded, at least vis-à-vis other UN Member States to 
which the breached obligation is owed, if the operations had been authorized by the UN 
                                                          
109 M Milanović, ‘Norm Conflict in International Law: Whither Human Rights?’ (2009-2010) 20 Duke 
Journal of Comparative and International Law 76-77 (‘Article 103 is not a simple rule of priority - it also 
precludes or removes any wrongfulness due to the breach of the conflicting norm. In other words, a state 
cannot be called to account for complying with its obligations under the Charter, even if in doing so it 
must violate some other rule - any rule, that is, except a rule of jus cogens’); V Gowlland-Debbas, ‘The 
Limits of Unilateral Enforcement of Community Objectives in the Framework of UN Peace Maintenance’ 
(2000) 11 EJIL 365, 368; D Bowett, ‘The Impact of Security Council Decisions on Dispute Settlement 
Procedures’ (1994) 5 EJIL 89. Preclusion of responsibility on the basis of Art 103, at least between UN 
Member States, could also be explained as a situation of consent, which is an uncontroversial 
circumstance precluding wrongfulness (Art 20 of the ILC Articles; see A Tzanakopoulos, ‘Collective 
Security and Human Rights’ in E De Wet and J Vidmar (eds) Hierarchy in International Law. The Place 
of Human Rights (OUP 2012) 65). 
110 Tzanakopoulos (n 109) 63-66. This Author maintains that the inclusion in the ILC Articles of self-
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State conduct (ibid, 65). 
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Security Council.111 It is true that, according to the letter of Article 103, the Charter’s 
obligations prevail only over ‘international agreements’, and not also customary 
international law norms, like the duty to respect another State’s territorial sovereignty 
and the principle of non-intervention. As suggested in the Report of the ILC’s Study 
Group on the Fragmentation of International Law, however, ‘the practice of the Security 
Council has continuously been grounded on an understanding that Security Council 
resolutions override conflicting customary law. […] Therefore it seems sound to join 
the prevailing opinion that Article 103 should be read extensively - so as to affirm that 
charter obligations prevail also over United Nations Member States’ customary law 
obligations’.112 
                                                          
111 Art 103 only refers to ‘obligations of the Members of the United Nations under the present Charter’ 
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It is well-known that, according to Article 24(1) of the UN Charter, the Security 
Council is the organ that has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of 
international peace and security. To this aim, the Charter confers broad powers upon the 
organ, in particular those provided in Chapter VII, that can be exercised whenever the 
Council determines the existence of a threat to the peace, a breach of the peace or an act 
of aggression.113 Unlike the case of countermeasures and self-defence, a cyber operation 
under Chapter VII does not require that Iran has breached international law, as long as 
the Security Council has qualified the situation as a threat to the peace.114 In such case, 
the Security Council could make recommendations under Article 39, adopt measures 
aimed at preventing the worsening of the crisis under Article 40 and, more importantly, 
adopt coercive measures under Articles 41 and 42. As to the former, Member States 
may be required to prohibit the provision to the targeted State of computer hardware and 
software that could be employed in the military nuclear activities of the proliferator. The 
non-exhaustive list of measures that the Council can recommend or decide under Article 
41 also includes ‘complete or partial interruption of . . . telegraphic, radio, and other 
means of communication’: the Security Council could thus adopt targeted cyber 
sanctions or limit the access to the internet of the State responsible for nuclear 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Transnational Law 586. Contra, see G Arangio-Ruiz, ‘Article 39 of the ILC First-Reading Draft Articles 
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undefined (United Nations Conference on International Organization, Documents, Vol XII, 1945, 505). 
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proliferation.115 Member States may be authorized or required to conduct monitoring 
activities or to hamper the internet access of the proliferator and to ensure that webpages 
are denied access from the domain name of the targeted State.116 Security Council 
sanctions will have to be implemented at the domestic level through the adoption of 
legislation requiring national Internet Service Providers (ISPs) to adopt restrictive 
measures against the targeted State.  
It is worth recalling that a Joint Declaration on Freedom of Expression and the 
Internet by the rapporteurs on freedom of expression of the United Nations, the 
Organization of American States and the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s representative on 
freedom of the media provides that ‘[c]utting off access to the Internet, or parts of the 
Internet, for whole populations or segments of the public (shutting down the Internet) 
can never be justified, including on public order or national security grounds’.117 The 
Declaration, however, is essentially addressed to governments and it may be argued 
that, if the cyber sanctions are decided by the Security Council, they would not be for 
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116 An example of this scenario, although not against a State responsible for nuclear proliferation, is the 
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public order or ‘national’ security grounds, but to enforce an interest of the international 
community. In such case, ‘restriction of certain content may be appropriate if authorized 
by the mandate, proportionate under international standards and necessary to protect a 
recognized interest’.118 
‘Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 
would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate’,119 it could authorize cyber 
attacks amounting to a use of force in order to react against nuclear proliferation 
qualified as a threat to the peace.120 It is true that Article 42 only refers to enforcement 
action ‘by air, sea, or land forces’: a literal reading of the provision might lead to 
conclude that enforcement in cyberspace is precluded to the Council. The purpose of 
Article 42, however, was to extend the collective security machinery to all military 
domains available at the time the Charter was drafted.121 An evolutive interpretation of 
the norm would then include any other military domain that becomes accessible through 
technological developments, such as outer space and cyberspace. 
It is difficult, however, to invoke Chapter VII of the UN Charter in the case of the 
cyber operations against Iran. It is true that, on 4 February 2006, the IAEA Board of 
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Governors referred the Iranian case to the Security Council122 and that there are several 
resolutions that have set up a sanctions regime against Iran and Iranian individuals ‘to 
constrain Iran’s development of sensitive technologies in support of its nuclear and 
missile programmes’,123 but none of them expressly refers to cyber sanctions:124 as has 
been argued, ‘[b]ecause the resolutions leave the power to expand the scope of the 
sanctions in the hands of the [Security] Council and the [Sanctions] Committee, states 
are not legally able to rely upon those resolutions and the Charter (particularly Articles 
25 and 103) to shield themselves from any legal consequences which additional 
measures may have’.125 If Stuxnet is qualified as a use of force as seems preferable, in 
particular, resolutions adopted by the Security Council under Article 41 would not be a 
proper legal basis and there is still no resolution authorizing UN Member States to use 
‘all necessary means’ (i.e. including the use of kinetic or cyber force) to push Iran to 
comply with its obligations. In fact, in the debates at the Security Council several States 
have reaffirmed that the resolutions adopted so far do not permit the use of force.126 
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6. Conclusions 
 
Recent cyber operations that allegedly targeted the Iranian nuclear programme 
epitomize the possible use of cyber measures for nuclear counterproliferation purposes. 
The legality of such operations must be assessed in the light of the general primary and 
secondary rules of international law: neither the means used (cyber instead of kinetic) 
nor the aim pursued (the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons) justify a special legal 
regime. While it may be uncertain that Flame and DuQu, that aimed at gathering 
intelligence and did not cause physical damage or disruption of services, were 
internationally wrongful act, the unlawful character of Stuxnet can hardly be 
questioned. The worm breached several primary rules of international law and could not 
be justified as a countermeasure: NPT States Parties (and, even less, non-Parties) were 
not ‘injured’ by Iran’s non-compliance with IAEA safeguards agreements or relevant 
Security Council resolutions nor would they be injured if Iran breached Article II of the 
NPT, and it does not seem that they are entitled to adopt countermeasures under Article 
54 of the ILC Articles. Furthermore, countermeasures cannot amount to a violation of 
the prohibition of the threat and use of force. If Stuxnet qualified as a use of force 
because of its physically destructive consequences, then, it would be lawful only if used 
in self-defence against an armed attack by Iran, but neither the acquisition nor the 
development of nuclear weapons (and even less uranium enrichment) constitute an 
armed attack in the sense of Article 51 of the UN Charter and customary international 
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law. Finally, Chapter VII of the UN Charter cannot be invoked to justify the operation: 
none of the resolutions sanctioning Iran that have been adopted by the Security Council 
make any reference to cyber operations or authorize Member States to use ‘all necessary 
means’ to ensure compliance with the NPT and IAEA safeguards agreements.  
Apart from any considerations on its legality, it seems that, all in all, Stuxnet was 
of limited use as counterproliferation measure, as it neither caused a significant 
shutdown of enrichment processes nor had a permanent impact on the centrifuges.127 On 
the other hand, the operation might have hampered the negotiations for a diplomatic 
solution of the crisis that were under way at the time the worm was discovered.128 In the 
long-term, Iran might have even taken advantage of the incident in order to improve its 
active and passive cyber defences and repel further cyber attacks on its critical 
infrastructures.129 
                                                          
127 Barzashka (n 3) 52-54, who however concedes that Stuxnet ‘might have temporarily slowed down 
Iran’s rate of expansion’ of its enrichment programme (ibid, 54; emphasis in the original). 
128 Ibid. 
129 ‘US general warns over Iranian cyber-soldiers’ (n 4). 
